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Abstract
The Japanese currency has recently weakened past 100 yen to the dol-
lar. The reason for the recent depreciation of the yen is the expectation of
higher ination in Japan, owing to the rapid projected growth in Japanese
base money, the sum of currency and commercial banking reserves at the
Bank of Japan.
We show through our empirical analysis that recent expansionary
Japanese monetary policies have generally helped raise U.S. GDP, despite
the appreciation of the dollar.
1 Introduction.
The Japanese currency has recently weakened past 100 yen to the dollar. The
reason for the recent depreciation of the yen is the expectation of higher ina-
tion in Japan, owing to the rapid projected growth in Japanese base money,
the sum of currency and commercial banking reserves at the Bank of Japan.
Under a exible exchange rate regime, national monetary policies are the basic
determinant of exchange rates among nations.
The recent depreciation of the yen has led to the criticism that Japan is
engaging in a "currency war," that Japan is stimulating its domestic demand
at the expense of its trading partners.1 In general, however, the expansion
of the money supply or the credible announcement of a higher ination target
does not necessarily constitute a currency war. We show in a two-country money
game under exible exchange rates,that uncoordinated monetary expansion does
not lead the world into a undesirable disequilibrium, regardless of whether the
monetary expansion has positive or negative spillovers on other countries.2
The pareto-optimality criterion holds whether the spillovers from say a Japanese
monetary expansion are negative or positive, whether they lower or raise U.S.
GDP. In real world international relations, however, it would seem better if
the monetary expansion in one country is accompanied by positive spillovers
on the other country. In the real world, an appreciating yen-dollar rate may
shift employment from the U.S. to Japan. This would hurt and upset the U.S.,
possibly damaging U.S.-Japan relations if continued. It is certainly better if
Japanese expansionary monetary policies are accompanied not only by a de-
preciating yen, but also expanding Japanese GDP and asset (equity and bond)
1Some conference participants have pointed out that dening a "currency war" solely as a
negative GDP spillover is too narrow. A broader denition of a "currency war" should include
when a particular constituent in one country is hurt by a foreign currency depreciation, and
the country retailates because ot political pressures from the constituent. For example, if the
U.S. auto industry is hurt by a yen depreciation, the U.S. may retaliate by imposing tari¤s
on Japanese auto imports.
2Our analysis, which follows from Hamada (1985) and Hamada and Okada (2009) is echoed
in Korinek (2013) who argues in an application of the theory of the second best, that if there is
an aggregate demand externality, say of insu¢ cient demand, then the country su¤ering from
that externality should enact policies to lessen the e¤ects of that insu¢ cient demand, such
as an expansionary monetary policy that depreciates the exchange rate, even if that should
mean than another country is hurt by its own appreciating currency.
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prices. If the rising Japanese GDP and asset prices help raise U.S. GDP, then
the U.S. will have less reason to get upset. The main objective of this paper is
to show whether Japanese expansionary monetary policies raise or lower U.S.
GDP, whether Japanese expansionary monetary policy has positive spillovers
on the U.S..
We show in our two country (U.S.-Japan) vector autoregressions that an
expansion in Japanese broad money, while depreciating the yen, will tend to raise
Japanese GDP and asset prices.3 Although expansionary Japanese monetary
policies may hurt U.S. GDP in the short-run, in the medium- to long-runs,
the increase in Japanese GDP will tend to raise U.S. GDP. Thus, Japanese
expansionary monetary policies should be welcomed by the U.S. We show in a
multicountry VAR model (GVARGlobal VAR), that expansionary monetary
policies in Japan will tend to also raise the GDPs of Japans smaller (non-
China) neighbors in the medium- to the long-runs, while hurting their GDPs in
the short-run.
While there have been academic analysis of the e¤ects of Abenomics mon-
etary policies on the domestic Japanese economy (Hoshi, 2014; Hausman and
Weiland, 2014; Michelis and Iacoviello, 2014; Rogers and Wright, 2014), our pa-
per is the rst to empirically examine the spillover e¤ects of the recent Japanese
monetary expansions on the U.S. economy.
2 Monetary Interdependence in a Two-country
World.
Let us introduce a world economy where prices are sticky and the two countries
target a point on the Phillips curve, yig(
i), where i=J (Japan) or the U.S., and
 is the ination rate and yg is the output gap.















Excess money creation refers to the money created in a country in excess of
the increase in domestic money demand.
Ination in the two countries can then be written as:
J = xJ + (xJ   xU:S:)
U:S: = xU:S: + (xU:S:   xJ);
3Since 1998, when Japan adopted its zero interest rate policy, Japanese monetary policy
certainly weakened its grasp on the ination rate and output. However, the quantitative
expansion of money can impact the economy, by way of an increase in Tobins q (by rais-
ing stock market values), by the credit accelerator e¤ect, and by depreciating the nominal
exchange rate.
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where -1< < 1. That is,  can be positive of negative. A positive  implies
that excess money creation abroad will lower the domestic ination rate, say,
owing to a domestic currency appreciation. This is the case of a "beggar-thy-
neighbor" monetary policy. From the Phillips curve relation, an expansion in
foreign monetary policy with negative spillovers on the partner country will
lower the domestic output gap for every ination rate in the domestic economy.
A negative , on the other hand, implies that excess money creation abroad
will raise the domestic ination rate. From the Phillips curve relation, an ex-
pansion in foreign monetary policy will raise the domestic output gap for every
ination rate in the domestic economy. This can occur when foreign money
creation raises foreign output or asset prices so much, that domestic ination
and output will also be raised. For example, Eichengreen and Sachs (1985,
1986) show that the sequence of devaluations in the 1930s led to a recovery of
domestic growth and equity markets, resulting in positive spillover e¤ects on
other countries, helping the global economies recover.
Suppose that each country targets its own ination rate (and simultaneously,
its accompanying output gap from the above Phillips curve relation). The two
countries will then minimize the distance between the actual and the desired
ination rates:
(J   aJ)2 = (xJ + (xJ   xU:S:)  aU:S:)2
(U:S:   aU:S:)2 = (xU:S: + (xU:S:   xJ)  aJ)2
The rst-order condition is given by a set of "reaction curves":
(1+)xJ   xU:S: = aJ (1)
-xJ + (1 + )xU:S: = aU:S: (2)
The "reaction curves" (1) and (2) are depicted and solved for 0< < 1 and -
1<  < 0 in Figures 1 (a) and 1 (b) respectively. In both cases, the U.S. ination
target is assumed to be higher than the Japanese ination target, aU:S: > aJ :
All points on the reaction curves are bliss points, so their intersection satises
the pareto-optimality criterion.
In Figure 1(a), the increase in home money will induce the increase of foreign
money and vice versa. As each country pursues its own ination target, the
system will converge to a stable ratio of money supplies and therefore a stable
exchange rate (as long as  < 1): Note that in this case, even if the expansion of
money in Japan has negative spillovers on the U.S., given the pareto optimality
criterion, U.S.s welfare cannot be improved without hurting Japans welfare.
Given that the uncoordinated, competitive equilibrium is pareto optimal, there
is no need for the two countries to coordinate their monetary policies.
The incidence of the Lehman crisis and in particular, the drastic quantitative
easing in the U.S. and in the U.K. seem to suggest that the initial short-run
reaction of the monetary expansion under exible rates is negative (in terms
of GDP) on Japan (as in Figure 1(a)). Otherwise, Japan would not have been
driven into a recession after 2009 when the U.S. and the U.K. were expanding
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money drastically.4Indeed in our two-country vector autoregressions, we nd
that an expansion in U.S. money will lower Japanese GDP in the short-run,
through a depreciation of the U.S. dollar.
However, in the medium- to long-runs, we nd that the monetary expansion
raised the GDPs and the stock markets of the U.S. and the U.K., leading to
increased Japanese GDP, from the increased U.S. and U.K. aggregate demands.
In terms of our model, in that medium- to long-run case,  > 1, so Figure 1(b)
would apply.5
While from a pareto-optimality welfare standpoint, the postive-spillover case
(the equilibrium depicted in Figure 1(b)) is no better than the negative-spillover
case (the equilibrium depicted in Figure 1(a)), in real world international rela-
tions, it would be better if expansionary monetary policies abroad are accom-
panied not only by a depreciating foreign currency, but also expanding foreign
GDP and asset (bond and stock) prices, so that foreign money growth will have
positive spillovers, at least in the longer run.
2.1 Vector Autoregressions of Japanese Monetary Policy,
1971-2013.
In this paper, we will examine the impact of Japanese monetary policies through
vector autoregressions. While it is by now well established that economies should
be characterized by dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, often such
models build in either monetary neutrality (real business cycle models) or mon-
etary e¤ectiveness (New Keynesian models). In these highly structural models,
there is little scope to examine whether or not Japanese monetary policy has
been to able to a¤ect the real economies in Japan and the U.S. in the rst place,
since the result is already assumed. Moreover, there is yet to be developed, a
well accepted quantitative model of monetary policies under the zero lower in-
terest rate bound, or of quantitative easing by the central bank, which both the
Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve have recently engaged in. In this paper,
we try to impose as little structure as possible to make the data speak, with
regards to the e¤ectiveness of Japanese monetary policies over the entire period
of 1971-2013.
It is by now well known that it is di¢ cult to uncover the properties of the
underlying dynamic general equilibrium models through vector autoregressions
(Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten, 2008; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson,
2006). Still, vector autoregressions can be useful in discerning regularities in
the data (Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson, 2007 ).
4 In this regard, the Chinese situation today may need more attention. If China reacts
to its current subprime-like nancial situation by expanding its monetary policy, then Japan
may be negatively a¤ected. Japan, however, may be able to undo such a negative impact by
further expanding its money supply.
5Figure 1(b) is drawn for the special case of -0.5< < 0, when the two "reaction curves"
intersect in the upper right hand quadrant. See Cooper (1985) for a more formal analysis
of this "positive spillover" case of national monetary policies, where a proposal is made for
international monetary coordination.
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We examine aggregate data from when the U.S. and Japan went o¤ the Bretton
Woods system in 1971to the recent start of "Abenomics," when Japan em-
barked on a massive increase in base money. While this 40 year period has been
sparked by numerous regime, expectational, and structural changes, we try to
(partially) capture these changes through the use of dummy variables and the
estimation of the model on di¤erent subperiods. We thus have tried di¤erent
sample periods such as staring the sample in 1980Q1 and 1995Q1, or ending the
sample in 1999Q4.6
In the U.S., and particularly in Japan, recent monetary policy has been char-
acterized by quantitative easing, which is to allow reserves held by depository
institutions far above the required level, while keeping the policy rate close to
zero. In principal, at interest rates near zero, the relationship between monetary
policy and other variables such as the exchange rate become non-linear.
Researchers have tried to handle such non-linear relationships using non-
linear time series econometrics such as Markov-Switching structural vector au-
toregressions. For example, in Japan, Fujiwara (2006), Inoue and Okimoto
(2008), Kimura and Nakajima (2013) and Hayashi and Koeda (2013) nd that
the impulse responses of ination and output to the monetary base is positive.
However, we consider the use of non-linear time series econometrics as be-
yond the scope of the current paper for the following reasons. First, our short-
term interest rate variable in Japan is the three month interest rate, not the
call rate, which is the policy rate. The Japanese three-month interest rate
never touches zero and has uctuated up and down (albeit slightly) even dur-
ing Japans quantitative easing period of the early 2000s. Second, impulse
response functions that we use extensively in this paper are ill-dened in a non-
linear econometrics framework (Hayashi and Koeda, 2013). And third, the main
model that we estimate (in Section 4) is a two country model in which there is
likely to be shifting regimes in both countries. None of these authors examine
the relationship between the expansion of monetary variables in Japan and the
exchange rate or real output in the U.S., the main focus of our paper. Esti-
mation of such two country, multiple-regime models with time series data will
quickly run into degrees of freedom problems, especially in maximum-likelihood
estimation.
2.2 Some Graphs.
Figure 2 depicts the short-term nominal interest rates for Japan and for the U.S.
For Japan, for short-term rates, we used the contracted 3-month interest rates
on loans and discounts (available from the Bank of Japan). We use these data,
rather than the data on overnight call rates, which are directly controlled by
the Bank of Japan, because the call rates have had a zero lower bound between
6Arai and Hoshi (2006) and Hutchison (2004) show that there was a structural break in
the money multiplier in the mid-1990s.
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2000 and 2006 and again from 2009 onwards.7 For the U.S., we use the Federal
Funds rate as the short-term interest rate variable. For the U.S. the Federal
Funds rate has been nearly zero since only 2009. Since the 1970s, U.S. short
rates have almost always been higher than in Japan. Since 1996, Japanese short
rates have been nearly zero, with a blip in rates in 2006 when the rst period of
quantitative easing was dropped. Short-term interest rates were again brought
to zero after the late 2000s nancial crisis.
Figure 3 examines the relationship between the gap in U.S. and Japanese
short-term nominal interest rates and the yen-dollar exchange rate. Interest rate
parity suggests that when the gap is large, the yen should be depreciating (the
line should be downward sloping), but we can hardly discern such pattern in this
simple plot. This lack of a pattern is another example of the well-known failure
of the short-term interest rate parity condition. That is, there appears to be
no consistent relationship between U.S. and Japanese interest rate di¤erentials
and movements in the yen-dollar nominal exchange rate.
Figure 4 depicts the ratio of base money in the U.S. to base money in Japan,
from 1971Q2 to 2013Q1. This ratio started to decline from the mid-1980s,
showing the desire of the Bank of Japan to reate the economy after the sharp
appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985 (see Hamada and Okada,
2009). Starting at around 1990, the ratio of base monies sharply increased. This
is a result of the relative tightening of monetary policy in Japan, as the Bank of
Japan tried to burst the real estate bubble of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In
the late 1990s, Japan embarked on the rst of its quantitative easing programs,
and the ratio of base monies declined; this was in spite of relatively loose money
in the U.S. Starting in 2006, and then in 2009, the ratio of base monies rose at
an unprecedented rate, the second rise owing to the series of quantitative easing
programs adopted in the U.S. Very recently the ratio of base monies between
Japan and the U.S. started to decline, as Japan sharply increased its base money
supply under "Abenomics."
Figure 5 depicts the correlation between the ratios of base monies in the
U.S. and in Japan with the nominal yen dollar rate. This gure is the so-
called "Soros" diagram, a folk tale in the nancial world. The upward tilt in
the correlation between the yen-dollar rate and the ratio of base monies on the
right hand side of the graph depicts the appreciation of the yen after the 1971
Bretton Woods oat to about 1974. This was a movement towards yen-dollar
purchasing parity (the yen was undervalued before 1971) after the post-Bretton
Woods dollar oat. The negative correlation between the ratio of base monies
and the exchange rate on the left-hand side are from the post-2006 period.
After the massive recent increases in the base money supply in the U.S., the yen
sharply appreciated relative to the dollar. Overall, in Figure 4, there appears
to be a negative relationship between the ratio of base monies and the yen-
dollar exchange rate. That is, when the base money of Japan grows faster than
the base money of the U.S., the yen tends to depreciate.8 We conrm this
7 In empirical analysis of Japanese monetary policy since the late 1990s, it is common to
use Japanese three-month treasury bill rate (Ueda, 2009).
8This relationship between base money ratios and the exchange rate was rst noted in the
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relationship between the expansion of base money and the depreciation of the
currency in our impulse responses below.9
Finally, Figure 6 shows the correlation between the Japanese actual CPI
ination rate and one-year ahead ination expectations.10The two series move
surprisingly close together, although there is a persistent upward bias in house-
hold inationary expectations. As shown in previous studies of Japanese ina-
tionary expectations (Ueda, 2009), households in Japan appear to form their
expectations based on actual ination of goods that they purchase often such
as food and electricity, which are impacted by imported food and energy prices.
Households tend to see ination rates as much higher than what they are actu-
ally. Still, we nd that movements in actual and expected ination are highly
correlated, and that ination expectations change more quickly than does real-
ized ination. The correlation between our measure of expected ination and
realized ination is about 0.57 from 1971 to 2013, and the expected ination
rate leads realized ination by two to three quarters. Through massive injec-
tions of base money and a depreciation of the yen-dollar nominal exchange rate,
which should increase imported food and energy prices, "Abenomics" seeks to
raise inationary expectations and thereby actual ination rates.
2.3 Japan: Vector Autoregressions of Monetary Policy.
Here we estimate vector autoregressions using Japanese data. We run vector
autoregressions on the output gap, the one year ahead CPI ination rate, the
three month nominal interest rate, one year ahead CPI ination rate forecast,
log base money (currency plus reserves), and the nominal yen-dollar rate, from
1971 Q1 to 2013 Q2. In symbols: {yJg ,
J ;mJ ; iJ ; e; eg: 11All vector autoregres-
sions include the CPI ination rate in energy and food as an exogenous variable,
since the food and energy CPI index is found in earlier studies to strongly a¤ect
the Japanese overall ination rate (Ueda, 2009). Other vector autoregressions
academic literature by Hamada and Okada (2010).
9Conference participants have pointed out that monetary bases may not be a useful measure
of monetary policy any more, since Central Banks are now buying long term bonds. That
there is still a strong positive correlation between a yen appreciation and the ratio of narrow
monies in the U.S. and in Japan suggests that narrow money ratios can a¤ect the level of the
nominal exchange rates, and the level of nominal exchange rates can a¤ect the level of real
activity.
10Japan does not have a ready series of consumer inationary expectations. Of the various
surveys, the Consumer Condence Survey collected by Bank of Japan, which begain in 1971,
covers the longest period. This survey is thus useful in conducting time-series analysis. A
major limitation is that its information is qualitative, that is households are asked if future
price changes are expected to be "lower" or "higher." Following Ueda (2009), we transform
this information into quantitative information by using the method of Carlson and Parkin
(1975). We thank Professor Kozo Ueda of Waseda University and formerly from the Bank
of Japan to give us his EXCEL programs for converting the qualitative information in the
Consumer Condence Survey to quantitative information on ination rates.




;where y* is potential output. A positive output gap
means that current output is above potential output. Potential output is calculated as the
trend output level from a Hodrick-Prescott lter.
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in addition include as exogenous variables, U.S. macroeconomic variables such
as the U.S. output gap, the U.S. CPI ination rate, and U.S. log base money. In
most cases, including the U.S. macroeconomic variables as exogenous condition-
ing variables did not make a di¤erence in the pattern of impulse responses. The
monetary policy shocksdened to be the unexplained uctuations in nominal
interest rates and in base moneyare small, given that the VARs of the kind
that we estimate have R-squared of above 0.95 for most of the equations (Boivin
and Giannoni, 2002).
In all vector regressions, the optimal lag length was chosen to be two or three
quarters by the Swartz criterion. In all cases, the roots of the vector regressions
were shown to be within the unit circle, implying the stability of the regressions.
2.3.1 Impulse Responses.
Our rst set of impulse responses (Figure 7) are based on the subset of variables:
{yJg ; 
J ; iJ ; eg:Since our interest is mostly in the impact of Japanese monetary
policy variables on other macroeconomic variables, we focus on the impact of a
shock to iJ on yJg and 
J and e. We examine the generalized impulse responses
of Pesaran and Shin (1999), since these responses are immune to the ordering
of the variables in the vector autoregression.
The results generally accord with most accepted macroeconomic models. A
positive interest rate shock initially raises the output gap, but soon, the output
gap turns negative, as recession gradually sets in with tighter money. Actual
ination rates decline with an increase in interest rates.
An increase in short term interest rates initially lowers inationary expec-
tations, but then inationary expectations rise, suggesting that agents may be
inferring from the rise in interest rates, that monetary authorities expect future
ination rates to be high.
Our ndings show that a tightening of Japanese interest rates results in a
fall in actual ination, while the link from tightening interest rates to a rise in
inationary expectations is more ambiguous. Our results are robust to di¤erent
starting samples and also to the inclusion of exogenous U.S. macroeconomic
variables.
We next depict impulse responses (Figure 8) when log base money is added
to the initial set of variables: {yJg ; 
J ; iJ ; e;mJg: 12We focus on the impact
of shocks to the monetary variables, iJ ;mJ : The inclusion of log base money
leaves una¤ected, the e¤ect of a positive interest rate shock on the output gap
12Conference participants have pointed out that the one year ex ante real interest rate should
be included as a monetary policy measure instead of broad money. In the VAR specication
above, ex ante real interest rates are implicitly included, through the inclusion of inationary
expectations and the (three month) nominal interest rate.
Also, as Figure 6 shows, Japanese inationary expectations are sluggish, so real interest
declines since early 2013 have been small. The scale of monetary expansion since early 2013
can be better captured by the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and the expansion
in base money.
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(positive) and actual ination (negative). Now on impact, a positive shock to
interest rates lowers inationary expectations, which is what we expect.
Although the e¤ects are small, a positive shock to base money lowers the
output gap on impact, but then the output gap starts to rise over time. After a
positive shock to base money, the ination rate immediately rises, and then falls,
while the shock induced increase in inationary expectations is small. Gradually,
the output gap tends to rise, suggesting that expanding money supplies takes
time to work.
These impulse responses to a positive shock to base money are sensitive to
the inclusion of the post-2000 sample. When the post-2000 sample is dropped
from the vector autoregression estimates (not depicted), a positive shock to base
money sharply raises the the output gap on impact, but then the output gap
slowly starts to decline. The ination rate immediately rises, and then falls. In
sum, regardless of the sample for which the vector autoregressions are estimated.
a shock to base money raises the output gap, either immediately (excluding the
post-2000 sample) or eventually, and immediately raises the actual ination rate
in all samples.
Our third set of impulse responses (Figure 9) depict the results including the
nominal yen-dollar exchange rate into the vector autoregressions: {yJg ; 
J ; iJ ; e;mJ ; eg:A
shock to interest rates has the same e¤ects on yJg ; 
J ; iJ ; eas before. As in many
earlier ndings in the literature (Kim and Roubini, 1999), a positive shock to
interest rates has a tendency to depreciate the Japanese exchange rate, because
of the failure of uncovered interest rate parity (not depicted). Importantly, when
the yen-dollar exchange rate is included in the VAR system, a rise in Japanese
short term interest rates lowers the output gap. As before, a positive shock
to base money raises output, but with a lag, and raises the ination rate over
the medium term. A positive shock to base money depreciates the yen-dollar
exchange rate (not depicted).
Finally, a shock to the nominal yen-dollar rate sharply raises the output gap
on impact, and raises the actual and expected ination rates. These expansion-
ary e¤ects of the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate accord with most
conventional models. These results are robust to the estimation over various
sample periods.
To summarize, we have shown that a positive shock to Japanese interest
rates lowers the Japanese output gap, actual ination rates, but over time tends
to raise inationary expectations and depreciate the nominal yen-dollar rate. A
shock to Japanese base money lowers the output gap initially, but over time the
output gap rises. Expansionary base money policies thus appear to take a while
to work. The impact of a positive base money shock on ination and inationary
expectations are positive in the short- to medium-runs. A shock to base money
depreciates the yen-dollar rate. Finally, a yen-dollar rate depreciation raises the
Japanese output gap and actual ination and ination forecasts.
2.4 E¤ect of Monetary Variables on the Stock Market,
9
and Long term Interest Rates in Japan.
In addition to depreciating the nominal exchange rate, the expansion of base
money can expand the economy by raising stock market prices and lowering
long term interest rates. One key result and perhaps even intent of the recent
expansion of base money in Japan is the simultaneous rise in the Japanese stock
market. In addition, the expansion of base money is also targeted to help reduce
long-term interest rates, but here the evidence is less clear, as long-term interests
rates have not decreased since the post-2012 base money expansion.
Below, we examine impulse responses from vector autoregressions that in-
clude in addition, the stock market values and the long term interest rates in
Japan. The long term interest rate in Japan is the 10-year government bond
interest rate, the value of the stock market is the log of the TOPIX index. We
also include time dummies to capture the e¤ects of changing monetary regimes.
We include time dummies for the 1980s, 1990s, 2000-2008, and 2009 onwards
and the Japanese CPI on food and energy as exogenous regressors, that is,
{yJg ; 
J ; iJ ; e;mJ ; e; sJ ; ilJg; where sJ is the value of the Japanese stock mar-
ket, and ilJ is the Japanese long-term interest rate.
Figures 10 and 11 depict the results. The Figures show that both a cut
in short term interest rates or an expansion in base money supply raises stock
market values on impact, with the rise in base money having longer lasting
e¤ects on equity prices. Stimulative monetary policy in the form of a cut in
short term interest rates sharply lowers long term interest rates, but a rise in
base money supply actually raises long term interest rates. This latter result is
perhaps because a rise in base money raises inationary expectations, leading
to a rise in long term interest rates.
Figure 11 shows that the output gap increases when there is an increase in
stock market values and, surprisingly, a rise in long-term interest rates. A rise in
stock market values appear to raise actual ination rates in the short-run and
expected ination rates over a longer period. Ination rates and inationary
expectations both appear to increase with shocks to long term interest rates.
Thus, it appears that in Japan, expansionary monetary policies that attempt
to lower long-term interest rates have perverse e¤ects on output, but monetary
policies that raise stock market values appear to reliably raise Japanese out-
put. Japanese long term interest rates are strongly inuenced by actual and
especially, expected ination rates in the country. Thus, expansionary mone-
tary policies that raise inationary expectations tend to raise long term interest
rates and output at the same time.
3 Impact of JapaneseMonetary Policy Variables
on the U.S. Economy.
As argued in Section 2, the expansion of Japanese monetary policy is likely
to result in a better outcome for both Japan and the U.S. in the real world if
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the increase in Japanese output results in an increase in U.S. output, and the
depreciation of the yen results in a smaller decline in U.S. output. Here we
present vector autoregressions including both Japanese and U.S. variables. We
examine the variables {yusg ,
us;mus; ius; e, yJg ;m
J ; J ; iJg; where the variables
superscripted with "us" are U.S. variables:13While we focus on the impact of
Japanese monetary variables (the nominal short-term interest rate and base
money) and the yen-dollar nominal exchange rate on the U.S. economy, we will
also examine the impact of U.S. monetary variables on the Japanese economy.
For the entire sample, 1971 to 2013, Figure 12 depicts the impulse responses
of one standard deviation shocks to the Yen-Dollar rate and short-term Japanese
interest rate on the U.S. output gap. A depreciation of the yen has a slight but
negative e¤ect on the U.S. output gap over the short run. A fall in Japanese
short-term interest rates slightly increases the U.S. output gap over the medium-
run, suggesting that overall, a loosening of Japanese interest rates has been
stimulative towards the U.S. economy. On the other hand, a reduction in U.S.
interest rates has a sharply negative e¤ect on the Japanese output gap.
Figure 13 depicts the impulse responses of a shock to Japanese base money
on the U.S. output gap, for the entire period, 1971 to 2013. An increase in
Japanese base money sharply lowers U.S. output in the short-run, but the U.S.
output gap starts to rise in about 8 to 9 quarters. The Japanese output gap
also declines (very) sharply in response to a rise in U.S. base money until about
8 to 9 quarters. Note that an expansion in U.S. base money hugely appreciates
the yen-dollar rate, implying that the decline in Japanese output is related to
the appreciation of the yen.
Why does a cut in Japanese interest rates expand U.S. output, while an
increase in Japanese base money lowers U.S. output in the short run? After
all, according to most conventional open economy macroeconomic models, both
are expansionary monetary policies and such policies should expand domestic
output, while hurting foreign output in at least the short-run.
The reason is that while an increase in base money reliably depreciates the
nominal exchange rate, a cut in short-term interest rates has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the nominal exchange rate (owing to the failure of uncovered interest
rate parity). If an expansion in base money depreciates the nominal exchange
rate, then domestic output would expand and foreign output should contract,
at least in the short run.
For the sample, 1971 to 1999, a period that mostly excludes the two Japanese
quantitative easing regimes after 2000, Figure 14 depicts the impulse responses
of the output gaps to the Yen-Dollar exchange rate and the short-term interest
rates. Compared to the sample that includes the post-2000 period, here the
negative response of the U.S. output gap to the yen depreciation is much larger;
a similar depreciation of the yen lowers the U.S. output gap by 3 times as
much.14
13As an exogenous variable, we add the Japanese food and energy CPI index. We drop
Japanese inationary expectations from the VARs, since adding these expectations did not
change any of our results.
14Perhaps this is because Japans weight in the world economy has been declining; while
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In about 9 quarters, however, the impact of the depreciation of the yen on
the U.S. output gap is back to zero. A decline in Japanese short-term interest
rates increases the U.S. output gap from the short run; again a loosening of
Japanese interest rates has been stimulative. As before, from about 1 to 8
quarters, a reduction in U.S. interest rates has had a sharply negative e¤ect on
the Japanese output gap.
Figure 15 depicts the impulse responses of a shock to Japanese base money
on the U.S. output gap, from 1971 to 1999. An increase in Japanese base money
lowers U.S. output for about 6 quarters. After an initial positive e¤ect, in about
3 quarters, a rise in U.S. base money also sharply lowers the Japanese output
gap. Again, an expansion in U.S. base money strongly appreciates the yen-dollar
rate over about 9 quarters.
For the sample 1995 to 2013, Figure 16 depicts the impulse responses of one
standard deviation shocks to the Yen-Dollar rate and short-term interest rates
on the U.S. and Japanese output gaps. Given the shorter sample size and the
fact that this period was characterized by massive doses of quantitative easing
in both Japan and the U.S., we should expect these results to be di¤erent from
earlier, but more relevant than the earlier results in examining the international
spillovers from changes in monetary policy. Indeed, the response of U.S. output
to a depreciation of the yen is quite di¤erent from before; now a depreciation of
the yen raises the U.S. output gap for about 9 quarters.
As before, a cut in Japanese short-term interest rates is stimulative, increas-
ing U.S. output after about 4 quarters. However, unlike before, a cut in U.S.
short rates is also highly stimulative for Japan (for 9 quarters). Since short-term
interest rates in Japan and in the U.S. were close to zero for much of the period
after 2000, perhaps it is not surprising to nd the e¤ects of interest rate shocks
on output gaps to be sharply di¤erent from the earlier periods.
Figure 17 depicts the impulse responses of shocks to base monies on U.S.
and Japanese outputs from 1995 to 2013. Unlike during the earlier period,
U.S. output now responds positively to an expansion in Japanese base money.
In response to an expansion in U.S. base money, Japanese output declines as
before for about 5 quarters, before increasing. As earlier, the yen-dollar rate
sharply depreciates (appreciates) in response to an increase in Japanese (U.S.)
base, suggesting that the Soros e¤ect (the depreciation of the yen-dollar rate
to an increase in the ratio of Japanese to U.S. base money) holds particularly
rmly during 1995 to 2013.
We next focus on the e¤ects of output gap shocks. Figure 18 depicts the
impulse responses of shocks to the U.S. output gap on the Japanese output
gap; and the Japanese output gap on the U.S. output gap (using the same
VAR specication as above, for the period 1971-2013). A positive shock to the
Japanese output gap has a positive e¤ect on the U.S. output gap, and vice versa.
This also holds for the sample periods 1971-1999 and 1995-2013 (not depicted).
In general, a one standard deviation shock to the U.S. output gap has about
before 2000, Japans weight in the global economy was as much as 20 percent; recently it has
been below 10 percent, owing to the rapid growth in the emerging economies.
12
as twice an e¤ect on the Japanese output gap as does an identical shock to the
Japanese output gap on the U.S. output gap. This is because U.S. output is
over twice that of Japanese output. Shocks to output gaps can be interpreted as
shocks to excess demand.15 Thus, a monetary fueled expansion in the Japanese
output gap will raise the U.S. output gap through increased Japanese demand.
Taken as a whole, the results here suggest that at least in the short-run, an
expansion in the base money of one country will have negative spillovers on the
other country, owing to the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, although
past about 9 quarters (2 years), the negative e¤ects become zero as positive
spillovers e¤ects from the domestic GDP expansion on the partner country take
root.
The positive spillovers occur, because the increase in base money expands
domestic output (through a domestic exchange rate depreciation or rise in asset
prices), and the domestic output expansion raises foreign output. Thus, in
the context of the model in Section 2, looser monetary policies in one country
appear to have both negative (in the short-run) and positive (in the medium
to long-run) spillovers on the other country. Interestingly, for the sample after
1995, a base money expansion by Japan has an unequivocal positive e¤ect on
U.S. GDP, both in the short- and in the medium-runs.
3.0.1 Spillover E¤ects of Abenomics Monetary Policies on the U.S.
Economy
Since taking o¢ ce in 2013, Prime Minister Abe has embarked on a massive
loosening of base money, in an attempt to stimulate the Japanese economy.
According to Hoshi (2014), between the end of 2012 and the end of 2014, the
Bank of Japan plans to increase the monetary base to 270 trillion yen, which
is 132 trillion yen larger than the monetary base at the end of 2012. This
represents a 96 percent increase in the monetary base in the two years since
2012. Here we will use the elasticities calculated from our impulse responses
above, to examine the e¤ects of this Japanese base money loosening on the U.S.
output gap. As mentioned, owing to this Japanese monetary expansion, there is
likely to be negative U.S. GDP spillovers from the yen depreciation and positive
U.S. GDP spillovers from the Japanese GDP increase. We can then calculate
the net e¤ect on the U.S. output gap of these two o¤setting spillovers.
We compute for each period, the change in the U.S. output gap arising from
the yen depreciation by multiplying the elasticity of the change in the U.S.
output gap with respect to a change in yen-dollar rate by the percentage depre-
ciation in the yen-dollar rate. These cumulative elasticities can be computed
from the impulse responses above. Using the VARs estimated from the sam-
ple 1971 to 2013, the cumulative elasticities are 0.00 upon impact, 0.00 after 3
quarters, -0.01 after 6 quarters, and -0.02 after 9 quarters.
15Positive output gap shocks can also be interpreted as scal expansions or positive pro-
ductivity shocks. Thus, a tax cut or government spending increase in Japan will increase U.S.
output.
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From the end of 2012 to May 2014, the yen-dollar rate went from 87 to 102,
an 18 percent depreciation. In our VARs, we are not explicit about how much
of this depreciation in the yen has been anticipated prior to the end of 2012.
Here we simply assume that the entire 18 percent depreciation in the yen was
an unanticipated shock.
From our quarterly time series data on the yen (from 1995 to 2013), we
know that the standard deviation of the yen-dollar rate is about 15, or about 14
percent of the average yen-dollar rate during this period. Thus, the yen-dollar
rate depreciation since the end of 2012 to now represents about a 1.25 standard
deviation depreciation.
Multiplying the cumulative elasticities above by the 1.25 standard deviation
shock to the yen-dollar exchange rate, we nd that the depreciation of the yen
should have reduced the U.S. output gap by about 1.25 percent after 6 quarters.
We can then compute for each period, the change in the U.S. output gap
arising from the Japanese output gap shock by multiplying the elasticity of the
change in the U.S. output gap with respect to a change in the Japanese output
gap. Using the VARs above, the cumulative elasticities are 0.0 upon impact,
0.01 after 3 quarters, 0.02 after 6 quarters, and 0.025 after 9 quarters. The
actual increase in the Japanese output gap is about 1 standard deviation from
the end of 2012 to the present. Multiplying the cumulative elasticities by the 1
standard deviation shock to the Japanese output gap, we nd that the increase
in the Japanese output gap should have increased the U.S. output gap by 1
percent, 2 percent, and 2.5 percent in 3, 6, and 9 quarters respectively.
Given these responses of the U.S. output gap to the yen depreciation and
Japanese output gap increase, we calculate that the positive impact on the U.S.
output gap of a rise in the Japanese output gap is larger than the negative
impact on the U.S. output gap of a depreciating yen-dollar exchange rate (2
percent increase versus a 1.25 percent decrease after 6 quarters). Thus, on net,
the expansion in Japanese base money has had positive spillovers on U.S. GDP.
3.1 Multicounty Vector Autoregressions.
Using VARs, we have so far examined whether expansionary monetary policies in
Japan have resulted in increases in the output gaps and ination rates in Japan
and in the U.S. Although yen-dollar policies are largely determined in discussions
between the Ministry of Finance in Japan and the Treasury Department in the
U.S., movements in the yen-dollar nominal exchange rate usually a¤ect the
domestic economies of Japans other trading partners as well.
For example, the nominal yen-dollar rate, the nominal won-yen rate, Japans
nominal e¤ective and real e¤ective exchange rates tend to be very highly cor-
related. The correlation coe¢ cients between the nominal yen-dollar rate, the
nominal won-yen rate, and the Japanese nominal and real e¤ective exchange
rates are 0.92, 0.91, and 0.58 respectively, in monthly data from 1980 to mid-
2013. These high correlations suggest that a change in the nominal yen-dollar
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is highly correlated with changes in Japans exchange rate with other impor-
tant trading partners. In the case of Korea, a depreciation of the yen against
the dollar will tend to appreciate the won against the yen, thereby hurting the
competitiveness of Korean tradeable industries. Thus, we should examine the
spillover e¤ects of Japanese monetary policies not only on the U.S., but also on
other Japanese trading partners.
Here we adopt the GVAR model of di Mauro and Pesaran (2013) to examine
how shocks to Japanese monetary policies are transmitted, not only to the U.S.,
but also to other Japanese trading partners. The GVAR model is essentially a
multicountry vector autoregression model with enough exogeneity assumptions
to make the model estimable and to conduct impulse responses. There are
currently 33 countries in the GVAR model. The rest of Asia bloc includes non-
Japan, non-China countries such as Korea and the Southeast Asian nations.
The variables included in our particular version of the GVAR model are
the nominal short-term interest rate, the nominal long-term interest rate, the
ination rate, real equity prices, the real exchange rate16 , and real GDP. Since
we are primarily interested in the impact of expansionary monetary policies, we
rst examine shocks to the nominal short-term interest rates. 17
In the GVAR model, declines in U.S. short-term nominal interest rates have
large positive international spillover e¤ects on the GDP of all countries (not de-
picted). A one standard error negative shock to U.S. nominal short-rates raises
U.S. GDP, Japanese and rest of Asian GDPs after one period. The Japanese
real exchange rate (against the U.S. dollar) appreciates for the entire period,
while rest of Asian exchange rates (against the U.S. dollar) rst appreciates,
then depreciates. Equity prices appreciate in the U.S., Japan, and in the rest
of Asia.
In the GVAR model, changes in Japanese short-term nominal interest rates
have negative short-run e¤ects on Japanese neighbors. A fall in Japanese short
rates does not lower U.S. or rest of Asian short-term rates. Real GDPs in Japan,
Asia, and the U.S. decline (not depicted). The yen and other Asian currencies
depreciate against the U.S. dollar, while equity prices increase in Japan, the
rest of Asia, and in the U.S. Long-term interest rates in Japan and in the rest
of Asia fall.
As in the Japan-U.S. vector autoregressions, the decline in short-term in-
terest rates do not directly positively impact output abroad (or even domesti-
cally in Japan), but may indirectly impact foreign output through the Japanese
short-term interest ratese¤ect on Japanese long-term interest rates and equity
prices.
A one standard error decline in Japanese long-term interest rates expands
Japanese GDP, and the GDPs in other Asian countries, but slightly lowers
the GDP of the U.S. A one standard error increase in Japanese equity prices
unambiguously increases the GDPs of Japan, the rest of Asia and the U.S. (not
16The exchange rates are bilateral vis-a-vis the U.S.
17Since base money data are not available for a broad cross-section of countries, we could
not include them in the VAR analysis.
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depicted). A depreciation of the real yen against the U.S. dollar raises Japanese
GDP, but lowers the GDPs of Asia and the U.S (Figure 19). Finally, Figure 20
shows that the expansion of Japanese GDP ambiguously expands the GDPs of
Asia and the U.S.
Thus, while expansionary Japanese monetary policies are likely to lower the
GDPs of the U.S. and non-Japan Asia through the depreciation of the real yen-
dollar rate, such policies should help expand the GDP of Japan through the
decline in long term interest rates and the rise in the yen. Over the medium- to
long-runs, the expansion of Japanese GDP, and equity and bond prices should
help raise the GDPs of the rest of Asia and the U.S.
4 Conclusion.
In this paper, we showed theoretically in a two country classical model that
an expansion in Japanese monetary policy need not be coordinated with an
expansion of U.S. monetary policy for the two country model to result in a
pareto-optimal outcome. We argued that if an expansionary monetary policy in
Japan resulted in positive spillovers for the U.S., then U.S. may be less hurt by
a Japanese monetary expansion induced exchange rate appreciation, and may
actually benet. While a monetary expansion induced currency depreciation in
one country can hurt the output of the other country, if the monetary expansion
causes an increase in GDP in the one country, say from an increase in equity
prices, then both countries can benet from the monetary expansion in the one
country.
To test the broad implications of the theory, we examine several impulse
responses from vector autoregressions. The single, two country, or multicountry
vector autoregressions show that the expansion in Japanese monetary policy,
whether due to a cut in short-term interest rates or an expansion in base money,
always results in a depreciation of the yen. The depreciation of the yen or the rise
in equity prices caused by the looser Japanese monetary policy always expands
Japanese GDP.
We show in our impulse responses from our two- and multicountry VARs
that while the depreciation of the yen will lower somewhat U.S. and Asian
GDPs, the expansion in Japanese GDP always raises the GDPs of the U.S.
and Asia. Thus, there is empirical justication that Japanese expansionary
monetary policy, while depreciating the yen, can help expand the GDPs of the
U.S. or its Asian neighbors, through the rise in Japanese GDP.
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  Figure 2: U.S. and Japanese Short-term Nominal Interest Rates (in percent) 
 
  
Figure 3: The Gap in U.S. and Japanese Short-term Interest Rates (DIFFINTER; in 
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Figure 5: The Yen Appreciates when U.S. Base Money Grows Faster than Japanese 
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Figure 6: Japanese Actual CPI Inflation and One Year Ahead Household 
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Figure 7: Japan: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap, Inflation, and Household 




Figure 8: Japan: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap, Inflation, and Inflationary 
Forecasts to the Short-term Interest Rate and Base Money Shocks 
 
 
Figure 9: Japan: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap, Inflation, and Inflationary Forecasts to the Short-term 
Interest Rate, Base Money, and the Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate Shocks 
 
 Figure 10: Japan: Impulse Responses of the Stock Market and Long-term Interest 
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Figure 11: Japan: Impulse Responses of the Japanese Output Gap and  









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Japan inflation forecast to Japan long interest
Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure  12: Japan-U.S.: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap  to Short-Term 
Interest Rates and the Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate, 1971-2012 
 
Figure 13: Japan-U.S.: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap and Yen-Dollar Rate 
to Base Monies, 1971-2013 
 
Figure 14: Japan-U.S.: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap to Short Term 
Interest Rates and the Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate, 1971-1999 
 
 
Figure 15: Japan-U.S.: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap and the Yen-Dollar 
Rate to Base Monies, 1971-1999. 
 
 Figure 16: Japan-U.S.: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap to Short Term 
Interest Rates and the Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate, 1995-2013 
 
 
Figure 17: Japan-U.S.: Impulse Responses of the Output Gap and the 
Yen-Dollar Rate to Base Monies, 1995-2013 
 
  
Figure 18: Impulse Responses of the Japanese Output Gap to the U.S. Output Gap 




Figure 19: Impulse Responses of 1 sd yen Depreciation on the GDPs of Japan, the U.S., and the Rest of Asia. 
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